Volume 6, Issue 6, November 2018, Page: 141-149
Research on the Correlation Between Executive Compensation and Business Performance in Electric Power Listed Companies
Qiaochu Li, School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing, China
Received: Oct. 29, 2018;       Accepted: Nov. 20, 2018;       Published: Dec. 20, 2018
DOI: 10.11648/j.jfa.20180606.12      View  109      Downloads  52
Abstract
With the rapid development of China's socialist market economy, the power industry has become a pillar industry for the development of the national economy. The reform of the electricity market system is also steadily advancing, and the competition among power companies is becoming more and more fierce. The effective improvement of the performance of power companies faces challenges. As an important part of the enterprise's human resources, executives play an extremely important role in the growth and steady development of the company; executive compensation can play a role in the strength of the company's senior management team and may affect the performance of the company. This paper analyzes and empirically studies the executive compensation incentives of listed companies in the power industry in 2017 and corporate performance. From the empirical analysis, it can be concluded that in the power industry, there is a significant positive correlation between firm size and executive compensation, and the correlation between corporate performance and executive compensation is not significant. Establish executive compensation and companies in listed companies in the power industry. The benefit-linked compensation management mechanism still has a long way to go. The conclusion of this study is of great significance and value for the salary management and enterprise performance improvement of power companies.
Keywords
Listed Power Companies, Executive Pay, Business Performance
To cite this article
Qiaochu Li, Research on the Correlation Between Executive Compensation and Business Performance in Electric Power Listed Companies, Journal of Finance and Accounting. Vol. 6, No. 6, 2018, pp. 141-149. doi: 10.11648/j.jfa.20180606.12
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 Authors retain the copyright of this article.
This article is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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